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Vol. XVII APRIL, 1932 No. 3
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AND CONTRACT EX-
EMPTIONS FROM TAXATION
BY JOSEPH H. ZUMBALEN
Exemptions from taxation are found in two forms, either as
written into the State Constitution or as enactments of the State
legislature. Exemptions set forth in a State Constitution are
always subject to amendment or repeal by action of the people
in adopting a constitutional amendment or a new constitution.
Those granted by a State legislature are also subject to amend-
ment or repeal either by the legislature itself or by the people by
amending the State Constitution or adopting a new one, with a
single exception. The exception covers exemptions embodied in
an act of the legislature which amounts to a contract between the
State and the person or corporation to be benefitted, and enact-
ments of the legislature which carry out a contract entered into
by the State. Exemptions coming within said exception are not
subject to amendment or repeal either by the State legislature or
by the people adopting a constitutional amendment or a new con-
stitution. That result follows from the provision of the Con-
stitution of the United States which denies to the States the
right to pass laws which impair the obligation of existing
contracts.'
Claims of exemption from taxation based upon an act of the
legislature which constitutes a contract of the State, present a
preliminary question as to the power of the legislature to bind
the State by such a contract. It is now settled that, in the
absence of express constitutional limitation of its power in that
'Art. 1, Sec. 10.
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respect, the legislature may bind the State by a contract exempt-
ing property of an individual or corporation entirely or partially,
perpetually or for a limited time. As the early State constitu-
tions contained no express limitations on the legislative power to
so contract, the power was indiscriminately exercised in the
older States, by special acts creating corporations for all kinds
of purposes and granting to them total or limited exemptions
from taxation. Then the people began to recognize the necessity
of curbing the legislative powers. Constitutional amendments
or new constitutions designed to remedy the evil were adopted
and the State legislatures in many States attempted to undo their
own work. But what had been done could not be undone, as the
States cannot pass any laws that impair the obligation of
existing contracts. The remedies invoked were effective only as
safeguards against future legislative abuse. The efforts of the
States to nullify exemptions resting on contracts with a State
resulted in litigation for a century, which it is proposed here
to trace through the United States Supreme Court Reports.
The first case is New Jersey v. Wilson.2 The Colony of New
Jersey having agreed to purchase from the Delaware Indians
their lands, and to purchase other lands as a home for the
Indians, the colonial legislature in 1758 passed an Act authoriz-
ing the purchase by the Colony of certain lands for a new home
for the Indians. The Act provided that the lands so purchased
for them "shall not hereafter be subject to any tax, any law,
usage or custom to the contrary thereof in any wise notwith-
standing." In 1801 the legislature of New Jersey passed an Act
authorizing the lands so purchased for the Indians to be sold,
which was silent as to taxation in case a sale thereof took place.
Pursuant to that Act the lands were sold. In 1804 the State leg-
islature repealed the colonial Act of 1758, and then proceeded to
assess taxes against them in hands of the purchasers. The State
Court held the repealing act of 1804 valid and declared said lands
liable to taxation. The United States Supreme Court reversed
that judgment, Chief Justice Marshall delivering the opinion,
which re-affirmed the doctrine laid down in Fletcher v. Peck,8
that the provision of the United States Constitution prohibiting
2 (1812) 7 Cranch 164.
3 (1810) 6 Cranch 87.
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the States from enacting any law impairing the obligation of
contracts applies to contracts to which a State is a party; and
holding that the Act of 1758 constituted a binding contract an-
nexing the exemption to the lands purchased for the Indians,
which the State could not abrogate by the Act of 1804.
The great case of Dartmouth College v. Woodward,4 although
it involved no tax exemption, is of vital importance here because
it established the doctrine, steadfastly adhered to since, that a
special charter of incorporation, when accepted by the cor-
porators, is a binding contract between the State and the corpo-
ration, and, therefore, protected by the contract clause of the
Federal Constitution.
Providence Bank v. Billings,5 holding that the Bank could be
taxed by the State because its special charter conferred no im-
munity, is important for the principles laid down in the Court's
opinion by Chief Justice Marshall, as follows:
That the taxing power is of vital importance, that it is
essential to the existence of the government, are truths
which it cannot be necessary to re-affirm. They are
acknowledged and asserted by all. It would seem that
the relinquishment of such a power is never to be pre-
sumed. No one can controvert the correctness of these
axioms. . . We will not say that a State may not re-
linquish it, that a consideration sufficiently valuable to in-
duce a partial release of it may not exist; but as the whole
community is interested in retaining it undiminished, the
community has a right to insist that its abandonment ought
not to be presumed in a case in which the deliberate purpose
of a State to abandon it does not appear. . . Any priv-
ileges which may exempt the corporation from the burthens
common to individuals do not flow necessarily from the
charter, but must be expressed in it, or they do not exist.
Gordon v. Appeal Tax Court,0 and Cheston v. Appeal Tax
Court,7 presented the question whether a Maryland Statute of
1841, for the general valuation and assessment of property, pro-
viding among other things for the assessment and taxation of
"all stocks or shares in any bank, institution or company incor-
porated by this State," impaired the obligation of the contract
between the State and certain Baltimore banks, arising out of
4 (1819) 4 Wheat. 518.
5 (1880) 4 Pet. 514.
6 (1845) 3 How. 132.
7 Ibid.
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the acceptance by said banks of certain acts of the legislature
extending the corporate existence of the banks upon their com-
pliance with terms prescribed in said acts. An act of 1813
extended the corporate existence of the banks to 1835, on condi-
tion of the several banks subscribing, in proportion to the paid in
capital of each, for as much stock in a certain turnpike road com-
pany as might be necessary to complete the road. The 7th sec-
tion of the Act provided that each of the banks should pay an-
nually into the State treasury twenty cents on every hundred dol-
lars of its stock actually paid up; and the 11th section provided:
"That upon any of the aforesaid Banks accepting of and com-
plying with the terms and conditions of this act, the faith of the
State is hereby pledged not to impose any further tax or burden
upon them during the continuance of their charters under this
Act."
By an act of 1821, incorporating another turnpike company,
the charters of the banks were extended to 1845, upon condi-
tion of their subscribing in same manner to the new turnpike
company. Sections 7 and 11 of the Act of 1813 were repeated
in this act. By an act of 1834, the charters of the banks were
again extended to 1859, but this act required them to pay a school
tax, and did not contain any stipulations corresponding to sec-
tions 7 and 11 of the Act of 1813.
The Maryland Court of Appeals held that the tax imposed by
the Act of 1841 was not a violation of the contract created by
the Act of 1821 between the State and the banks which had
accepted and complied with its conditions.
But the United States Supreme Court, in an opinion by Mr.
Justice Swayne, reversed that judgment, holding that the stock-
holders in the banks were exempt from the tax imposed by the
Act of 1841, during the continuance of their charters under the
Act of 1821 (i. e., until 1845), but were not entitled to any ex-
emption under the Act of 1834 which merely extended their
charters to 1859, but did not continue the immunity conferred
by the earlier act.
A group of cases known as the Ohio Bank Tax cases comes
next in order. The first Ohio Constitution (1802) contained a
general grant of legislative authority to the General Assembly,
unlimited and unrestricted unless the following clause operated
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol17/iss3/4
EXEMPTIONS FROM TAXATION
as a limitation, viz.: "To guard against the transgression of the
high powers which we have delegated, we declare that all powers
not hereby delegated remain with the people." The Constitution
of 1802 remained in force, unchanged in that particular, until
superseded by the new Constitution, September 1, 1851. In
1829 The Commercial Bank of Cincinnati was created by special
charter, which provided that the State of Ohio should be en-
titled to receive 4 percent on all dividends made by the Bank, to
be paid in the manner prescribed by an act of 1825, the latter
being the first Ohio statute in terms levying a tax upon banks.
In 1831 an act to tax banks and certain kinds of other corpo-
rations at the rate of 5 percent on dividends was enacted. But
the Supreme Court of Ohio in 1835 decided that the charter of
The Commercial Bank constituted a contract which prevented
the State from exacting a higher tax than 4 percent on its
dividends.8
In 1845 the Ohio legislature passed an act to incorporate the
State Bank of Ohio and other banks, section 60 of which pro-
vided that each banking company under the act, on accepting
and complying with its provisions, should semi-annually, on the
days designated for declaring dividends, set off to the State
6 percent on its profits, etc., which sum so set off should be in
lieu of all taxes to which the bank or its stockholders would
otherwise be subject. Some fifty banks, branches of the Ohio
State Bank or independent institutions were organized under the
Act of 1845.
In 1851 the legislature passed an act to tax banks and other
stocks the same as other property was then taxable under the
laws of the State; and in 1852, in accordance with the mandate
of the Constitution of 1851, the legislature passed an act for
the taxation of all the property in the State, including that of
the banks incorporated under the Act of 1845. Both these Acts
were resisted by the banks and corporations created by certain
other special acts. But the Supreme Court of Ohio overruled
its decision in the case of The Commercial Bank, and held that
the Act of 1845, incorporating the banks, contained no pledge
by the State not to change the method or rate of taxation, and
did not constitute a contract between the banks and the State;
8State v. Commercial Bank (1835) 7 Ohio, pt. 1, 125.
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but that, if it could be so construed, it amounted to a surrender of
the sovereign power of taxation and was void for want of
power in the legislature to make it. These cases reached the
United States Supreme Court, and the judgments of the Ohio
Court were reversed in 1853, with one exception, namely, that
of the Ohio Life Insurance and Trust Company, created by
special act in 1834. The United States Supreme Court over-
ruled all three propositions asserted by the Ohio Court; but the
latter refused to yield, holding that the Ohio legislature had
not the constitutional authority under the Constitution of 1802
to surrender or abridge in any manner the right of taxation,
and that the Ohio Supreme Court had so solemnly adjudged, so
that the question was no longer an open one in Ohio.9 Then
in 1857 the Ohio Supreme Court again retraced its steps, holding
that the charters of two universities incorporated under the
old constitution created valid contracts for exemptions,10 and
that the Act of 1852 did not deprive the Athens Branch Bank of
its right of exemption under the Act of 1845.11 However, if
was not yet ready to surrender, as in 1858 it once more held12
that section 60 of the Act of 1845 did not constitute an ir-
repealable contract with the banks organized under that act.
The first of the Ohio cases to reach the United States Supreme
Court was Piqua Branch Bank v. Knoop.13 The Bank was or-
ganized in 1847 under the Act of 1845 and was, therefore, en-
titled to the limited exemption provided by Section 60 of that
Act (supra). The State officers proceeded to tax it under the
Act of 1851 (supra), and the State Supreme Court held it tax-
able under the Act of 1851. The United States Supreme Court
reversed the judgment, holding that the Act of 1845 was the
special charter of the banks created by it or created afterward
in pursuance of its provisions, and constituted a contract be-
tween the State and each of said banks fixing the amount of
taxes to be paid during the life of each of the banks; that as
9 Milan and Richland Plank Road Company v. Husted (1854) 3 Ohio
St. 578.
lo Matheny v. Golden (1856) 5 Ohio St. 361; Kumber v. Traber (1856) 5
Ohio St. 442.
11 State v. Moore (1856) 5 Ohio St. 444.
12 Sandusky City Bank v. Wilbur (1858) 7 Ohio St. 481.




the operation of the law of 1851 would increase the tax to be
paid by the banks, it violated the contract clause of the United
States Constitution. In the argument of the case counsel for
the defendant in error referred to Providence Bank v. Billings,'14
which prompted Mr. Justice McLean, who delivered the opinion
of the Court, to say:
This reference impresses me with the shortness and un-
certainty of human life. Of all the judges on this bench,
when that decision was given,. I am the only survivor. From
several circumstances the principles of that case were
strongly impressed upon my memory; and I was surprised
when it was cited in support of the doctrines maintained
in the case before us. The principle held in that case was,
that where there was no exemption from taxation in the
charter, the bank might be taxed. This was the unanimous
opinion of the judges, but no one of them doubted that the
Legislature had the power, in the charter or otherwise, from
motives of public policy, to exempt the bank from taxation,
or by compact to impose a specific tax on it. And this is
clear from the language of the Court.
Chief Justice Taney filed a separate concurring opinion,
saying:
I think that by the 60th section of the Act of 1845, the
State bound itself by contract to levy no higher tax than
the one therein mentioned, upon the banks or stocks in the
banks which organized under that law during the continu-
ance of their charters. In my judgment the words are too
plain to admit of any other construction.
Justices Catron, Daniel and Campbell filed dissenting opinions.
Ohio Life Insurance and Trust Company v. Debold'5 is unique,
inasmuch as there was no opinion of the Court, as such, although
six opinions were delivered. Justices McLean, Curtis and Nel-
son were for reversing the judgment, holding that the provision
relating to taxation in the charter (granted in 1834), made the
60th section of the State Bank Act of 1845 part of that charter.
The remaining judges were in favor of affirming the judgment,
some construing the charter provisions as not amounting to an
irrevocable contract, while others held they were bound by the
construction of the Ohio Constitution and Statutes by the
14 N. 5 above.
25 (1853) 16 How. 416.
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Supreme Court of the State, although they might not personally
agree with the construction thereof. Chief Justice Taney voted
with the majority to affirm the judgment, basing his vote, how-
ever, upon the proposition that the charter of the company con-
tained no pledge by the State that the method or rate of taxation
would not be altered or changed during its existence, and that
section 60 of the Act of 1845 did not become part of its charter.
He rejected the reasoning on which the State Court based its
judgment, and formulated the principles which must control the
Court in such cases, if the integrity of the contract clause of the
Federal Constitution is to be maintained, as follows:
This brings me to the question more immediately before
the court: did the Constitution of Ohio authorize its Legisla-
ture, by contract, to exempt this Company from its equal
share of the public burdens during the continuance of its
charter. The Supreme Court of Ohio, in the case before us
has decided that it did not. But this charter was granted
while the constitution of 1802 was in force; and it is evi-
dent that this decision is in conflct with the uniform con-
struction of that constitution during the whole period of its
existence. It appears from the Acts of Legislature, that the
power was repeatedly exercised while that constitution was
in force, and was acquiesced in by the people of the State. It
was distinctly sanctioned by the Supreme Court of the
State in the case of The State v. The Commercial Bank of
Cincinnati, 7 Ohio, 125.
And when the Constitution of a State, for nearly half a
century, has received one uniform and unquestioned con-
struction by all the departments of the government, legisla-
tive, executive and judicial, I think it must be regarded as
the true one. It is true that this Court always follows the
decision of the State Courts in the construction of their own
constitution and laws. But where those decisions are in
conflict, this Court must determine between them. And cer-
tainly a construction acted on as undisputed for nearly fifty
years by every department of the government, and sup-
ported by judicial decision, ought to be regarded as sufficient
to give to the instrument a fixed and definite meaning. Con-
tracts with the State authorities were made under it. And
upon a question as to the validity of such a contract, the
Court, upon the soundest principles of justice, is bound to
adopt the construction it received from the State authorities




The duty imposed upon this Court to enforce contracts
honestly and legally made, would be vain and nugatory, if
we were bound to follow those changes in judicial decisions
which the lapse of time, and the change in judicial officers,
will often produce. . . The sound and true rule is, that
if the contract, when made, was valid by the Laws of the
State, as then expounded by all the departments of its
government, and administered in its Courts of justice, its
validity and obligation can not be impaired by any subse-
quent act of the Legislature of the State, or decision of its
courts, altering the construction of the law. . .
It has been contended, on behalf of the Treasurer of the
State, that the construction given to these Acts of Assembly
by the State Courts ought to be regarded as conclusive. It
is said that they are laws of the State, and that this Court
always follows the construction given by the State Courts
to their own constitution and laws.
But this rule of interpretation is confined to ordinary
acts of legislation, and does not extend to the contracts of
the State, although they should be made in the form of a
law. For it would be impossible for this court to exercise
any appellate power in a case of this kind, unless it was at
liberty to interpret for itself the instrument relied on as the
contract between the parties. It must necessarily decide
whether the words used are words of contract, and what is
their true meaning, before it can determine whether the ob-
ligation the instrument created has or has not been impaired
by the law complained of. . .
It is very true, that if there was any controversy about the
construction and meaning of the Act of 1851, this court
would adopt the construction given by the State Court. And
if that construction did not impair the obligation of the con-
tract as interpreted by this court, there would be no
ground for interfering with the judgment. For then the
contract, as expounded here, would not be impaired by the
state law. But if we were bound to follow not only the in-
terpretation given to the law, but also to the instrument
claimed to be a contract, and alleged to be violated there
would be nothing left for the judgihent and decision of this
court. There would be nothing upon which a writ of error
or appeal could bring here for consideration and judg-
ment; and the duty imposed upon this Court under this
clause of the Constitution would, in effect, be abandoned.
Dodge v. Woolsey17 was a bill by a stockholder of an Ohio bank
organized by the Act of 1845, to enjoin collection of a tax as-
17 (1855) 18 How. 331.
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sessed by the State of Ohio against said bank under the Act of
1852. The United States Circuit Court granted a perpetual in-
junction and the Supreme Court affirmed that decree. The only
difference between this case and the Piqua Branch Bank18 case is
that the latter arose under the Ohio Act of 1851, while here the
Statute which it was alleged violated the bank's charter was the
Act of 1852, passed pursuant to the Constitution of 1851. The
Court held, Justice Swayne delivering the opinion, that the pro-
vision for taxation in the bank's charter was a relinquishment
of the power to tax beyond the amount therein fixed; that it was
a contract binding subsequent legislatures during the charter
period; that a change in the State constitution cannot release a
state from contracts made under a constitution which permitted
them to be made; and that the Ohio Constitution of 1802 clearly
did perrhit the legislature to make the contract in question.
Justice Campbell delivered a dissenting opinion, concurred in
by Justices Daniel and Catron, denying the power of one legis-
lature to make contracts which limit the powers of subsequent
legislatures, and insisting upon the right of the people of a
sovereign State at any time to nullify any act of a legislature
which curtails the taxing power of the State.
In Mechanics' and Traders' Bank v. Debold'D and Same v.
Thomas,20 judgments of the Ohio Supreme Court were reversed,
as these cases grew out of the same facts and were ruled by
the Piqua Branch Bank2' case and Dodge v. Woolsey.22
Jefferson Branch Bank v. Skelly 23 and Franklin Branch v.
State of Ohio,24 were the last of the Ohio Bank Tax cases to
reach the United States Supreme Court. Again the judgments
of the Ohio Supreme Court were reversed, Justice Swayne deliv-
ering the opinions, which were unanimous.
McGehee v. Mathis25 arose out of the following facts. The
State of Arkansas, by a legislative act in 1851, provided for the
sale of the swamp and overflowed lands within the State, which
had been granted to the State by Act of Congress, to be sold or
used in reclaiming said lands for cultivation. One section of
the Act provided that "to encourage by all just means to progress
Is N. 12 above. 22N. 16 above.
19 (1855) 18 How. 380. 23 (1862) 1 Black 436.
20 (1855) 18 How. 384. 24 (1862) 1 Black 474.
21 N. 12 above. 25 (1866) 4 Wall. 143.
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and the completing of the reclaiming such lands by offering in-
ducements to purchasers and contractors to take up such lands,
all said swamp and overflowed lands shall be exempt from taxa-
tion for the term of ten years, or until they shall be reclaimed."
In 1855 that section of the Act of 1851 was repealed and pro-
vision was made for the taxation of swamp and overflowed lands,
sold or to be sold, precisely as of other lands. Before that re-
peal McGehee had become the owner, by transfer from con-
tractors, of a large amount of scrip issued under the Act of 1851
and with that scrip, after the repeal, took up and paid for large
tracts of said lands in Chicot County. By an act of 1857 the
legislature provided for the building of levees and drains in
Chicot County, and authorized a special tax against lands bene-
fitted to meet the cost. The special tax was assessed against
McGehee's unreclaimed swamp lands and McGehee resisted pay-
ment. The State Court held the repealing Act of 1855 and the
Act of 1857 valid, and refused relief.
The United States Supreme Court reversed the judgment, and
held, in an opinion by Chief Justice Chase from which there was
no dissent, that the Act of 1851 constituted a contract between
the State and the holders of the land scrip issued thereunder by
which the State bound itself to convey the land for the scrip
and to refrain from taxation for the time specified; that the
exemption from taxation was the principal element in the value
of the land conveyed, which the repeal of the exemption would
destroy and thus impair the contract made by the State; and
that in view of the purpose and scope of the Act of 1851, the
exemption applied not merely to general taxes but also to special
taxes for improvements benefitting the land.
Home of The Friendless v. Rowse26 and Washington Uni-
versity v. Rowse,2 7 arose under special charters granted by the
State of Missouri in 1853, when there was no constitutional limi-
tation upon the legislature's power to grant tax exemptions.
The charters of these corporations provided that "all property
of said corporation shall be exempt from taxation, and the 6th,
7th and 8th sections of the first article of the Act concerning
corporations, approved March 19, 1845, shall not apply to this
corporation." The 7th section referred to provided "that the
26 (1869) 8 Wall. 430. 27 (1869) 8 Wall. 439.
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charter of every corporation that shall hereafter be granted by
the Legislature shall be subject to alteration, suspension and re-
peal, in the discretion of the Legislature." In 1865 a new State
Constitution was adopted, which provided that no property, real
or personal, shall be exempt from taxation, except such as may
be used exclusively for public schools, and such as may belong
to the United States, the State of Missouri, Counties or municipal
corporations." Following that change in the organic law, taxes
were assessed against the property of both said corporations,
and they sought to enjoin the collection thereof. The State Su-
preme Court ruled against the claim of exemption, holding that
the legislature had no power, even under the Missouri Constitu-
tion of 1820, to grant away or curtail the power to tax. But the
United States Supreme Court reversed the judgments, holding
that the charters constituted contracts, when accepted and acted
upon by the corporations, between the State and the corpora-
tions that the property given for the charitable uses specified
should, so long as it was applied to those uses be exempt from
taxation, and that any attempt to tax such property impaired
the obligation of that contract.
Justice Davis, delivering the Court's opinion in the case of the
Home of The Friendless, said:
The validity of this contract is questioned at the bar on
the ground that the Legislature had no authority to grant
away the power of taxation. The answer to this position is,
that the question is no longer open for argument here, for
it is settled by the repeated adjudications of this court,
that the State may, by contract based on a consideration,
exempt the property of an individual or corporation from
taxation, either for a specified period, or permanently. And
it is equally well settled that the exemption is presumed to
be on sufficient consideration, and binds the State if the
charter containing it is accepted.
In Washington University's case he said:
The charter of the University having been accepted, and
the Corporation since its acceptance, having been actively
employed in the specific purpose for which it was created,
the exemption from taxation became one of the franchises
of the Corporation of which it would not be deprived by any
species of State legislation.
Justice Miller dissented and Chief Justice Chase and Justice
Field concurred in the dissent.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol17/iss3/4
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Wilmington and Raleigh Railroad Company v. Reid28 is
another case of a special charter of incorporation, granted by the
State of North Carolina in 1833. The charter provided that
"the property of said Company and the shares therein shall be
exempted from any public charge or tax whatsoever." By a
later statute the State attempted to levy taxes upon the fran-
chise, rolling stock and real estate owned by the Railroad. The
State Court sustained that attempt, but the Supreme Court re-
versed the judgment. Justice Davis again wrote the Court'l
opinion (no dissent being recorded) saying:
It has been so often decided by this court that a charter
of incorporation granted by a State creates a contract be-
tween the State and the Corporators, which the State can
not violate, that it would be a work of supererogation to
repeat the reasons on which the argument is founded. It
is true that when a corporation claims an exemption from
taxation, it must show that the power to tax has been clearly
relinquished by the State, and if there be a reasonable doubt
about this having been done, that doubt must be solved in
favor of the State. . . If, however, the contract is plain
and unambiguous, and the meaning of the parties to it
can be clearly ascertained, it is the duty of the court to give
effect to it, the same as if it were a contract between private
persons, without regard to its supposed injurious effects
upon the public interest. . . If there be no constitu-
tional restraint on the action of the Legislature on this
subject, there is no remedy, except through the influence of
a wise public sentiment, reaching and controlling the con-
duct of the law making power.
In Raleigh and Gaston Railroad Company v. Reid2 9 the judg-
ment of the North Carolina Supreme Court was reversed for
the reasons stated in Wilmington and Raleigh Railroad Com-
pany v. Reid.30 The only point of difference in the cases is that
in this case the exemption was only a limited one.
In Humphrey v. Peques3' the lower court sustained the claim
of exemption, and its decree was affirmed by the Supreme Court
on the authority of Wilmington and Raleigh Railroad Company
v. Reid.32
The facts of Pacific Railroad Company v. Maguire33 were:
28 (1872) 13 Wall. 264. 31 (1873) 16 Wall. 244.
29 (1872) 13 Wall. 269. ;2 N. 27 above.
so N. 27 above. 33 (1873) 20 Wall. 36.
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The Pacific Railroad Company was incorporated in 1849 by a
special act, granted by the Missouri Legislature. In 1852, its
charter was amended in several particulars and it was exempted
from taxation until its road was completed and put in operation
and until it should declare a dividend on its capital stock, not,
however, extending longer than two years after completion. The
road was completed and put in operation on April 1, 1866. The
new Missouri Constitution, requiring taxation of all property
in the State, took effect on July 4, 1865, and the tax in question
was levied in accordance with its mandate. The State Court
held the exemption was abrogated by the new constitution; but
the United States Supreme Court reversed the judgment, holding
that the State was bound by the contract contained in the charter
of the Company.
Farrington v. State of Tennessee3 4 was an action by a stock-
holder in a bank incorporated by special act in 1858, to enjoin
collection of a tax assessed against plaintiff on stock in the bank
owned by him under the general revenue law of the State. The
charter of the bank provided "that the said Company shall pay
to the State an annual tax of one-half of one percent on each
share of capital stock subscribed, which shall be in lieu of all
other taxes." The State Supreme Court held the taxes so as-
sessed valid, but the United States Supreme Court reversed that
judgment, holding that the charter of the bank was a contract
between the bank and the State, by which the imposition of any
tax other than that specified therein was expressly forbidden.
Justice Swayne delivered the opinion of the Court, saying:
A compact lies at the foundation of all national life. Con-
tracts mark the progress of communities in civilization and
prosperity. They guard, as far as is possible, against the
fluctuations of human affairs. They seek to give stability to
the present and certainty to the future. They gauge the
confidence of man in the truthfulness and integrity of his
fellow-man. They are the springs of business, trade and
commerce. Without them society could not go on. Spot-
less faith in their fulfillment honors alike communities and
individuals. Where this is wanting in the body politic, the
process of descent has begun, and a lower plane will be
speedily reached. To the extent to which the defect exists
among individuals, there is decay and degeneracy. As are
34 (1878) 5 Otto 679.
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the integral parts, so is the aggregated mass. Under a
monarchy or aristocracy, order may be upheld and rights
enforced by the strong arm of power. But a republican
government can have no foundation other than the virtue
of its citizens. When that is largely impaired, all is in peril.
It is needless to lift the veil and contemplate the future of
such a people. . . History but repeats itself. The trite
old aphorism, that "Honesty is the best policy," is true alike
of individuals and communities. It is vital to their highest
welfare.
The Constitution of the United States wisely protects this
interest, public and private, from invasion by State laws. It
declares that "No State shall . . . pass any . . .
law impairing the obligation of contracts." This limitation
no member of the Union can overpass. It is one of the most
important functions of this tribunal to apply and enforce it
upon all proper occasions.
Referring to the Dartmouth College35 case, he said:
The question decided in that case has since been con-
sidered as finally settled in the jurisprudence of the entire
country. Murmurs of doubt and dissatisfaction are oc-
casionally heard; but there has been no re-argument here,
and none has been asked for. The same doctrine has been
often re-affirmed in later cases.
On the question of the construction of the bank's charter, it
was pointed out that the capital stock and the shares might both
be taxed, and yet not be double taxation; that in addition its
franchise, accumulated earnings, profits and dividends, and real
estate were all proper subjects of taxation. But, said the Court,
"When this charter was granted, the State might have been
silent as to taxation. In that case, the power would have been
unfettered. . . It might have reserved the power as to some
things, and yielded it as to others. It had the power to make
its own terms, or to refuse the charter. It chose to stipulate for
a specified tax on the shares, and declared and bound itself that
this tax should be 'in lieu of all other taxes.'"
In Northwestern University v. Illinois,36 the University was
incorporated by special act of the Illinois General Assembly,
and its charter was amended in 1855, one of the amendments
providing that "All property of whatever kind or description,
belonging to or owned by said Corporation, shall be forever free
35 N. 4 above.
36 (1879) 9 Otto 309.
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from taxation for any and all purposes." The Constitution of
1848, then in force, provided that "The property of the State
and counties, both real and personal, and such other property
as the General Assembly may deem necessary for school, re-
ligious and charitable purposes, may be exempt from taxation."
The Constitution of 1870 provided that "the property of the
State, counties and other municipal corporations, both real and
personal, and such other property as may be used exclusively for
agricultural and historical societies, for school, religious, ceme-
tery and charitable purposes, may be exempted from taxa-
tion . . . by general law." In 1874 the State assessed taxes
against a large number of city lots and lands owned by the Uni-
versity, which were claimed to be exempt although not used
directly for educational purposes.
The State Supreme Court denied the claim of exemption, as to
the lots and lands in question, holding that the quoted provision
of the Constitution of 1848, permitted exemption only of prop-
erty directly and immediately used for schools. The United
States Supreme Court reversed the judgment, Justice Miller
(who, it will be recalled, had dissented in some earlier cases)
delivering the opinion of the Court, from which there was no
dissent. The Court held that the charter provision of 1855 was
a contract binding upon the State, because the Constitution of
1848 empowered the Legislature to exempt "such property as
they might deem necessary [not for the use of schools, but] for
school purposes."
The Court said:
The distinction is, we think, very broad between property
contributing to the purpose of a school, made to aid in the
education of persons in that school, and that which is
directly or immediately subjected to use in the school. The
purposes of the School, and the school are not identical. The
purpose of a college or university is to give youth an educa-
tion. The money which comes from the sale or rent of land
dedicated to that object aids this purpose. Land so held
and leased is held for school purposes, in the fullest and
clearest sense.
In St. Anna's Asylum v. New Orleans,.17 the Asylum was in-
corporated by special legislative act in 1853, for charitable pur-
37 (1882) 15 Otto 362.
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poses, the charter providing that its property, real and personal
should be exempt from all taxation either by the State, parish,
or city in which it is situated, any law to the contrary notwith-
standing. In 1874 a valuable cotton gin was devised to the
Asylum, against which the City of New Orleans thereafter as-
sessed City taxes, claiming authority to do so under the State
Constitution of 1868. The Asylum leased the property, but
applied the income derived therefrom to its charitable purposes.
The State Supreme Court denied the Asylum's claim of exemp-
tion, and its judgment was reversed by the United States Su-
preme Court. Justice Bradley delivered the opinion of the
Court, from which we quote the following:
The language of the exemption is so explicit and so
broad, and comes in after so many allusions to property
which it is supposed the Corporation might acquire, other
than that which would be directly used for food and shelter
to the destitute and helpless persons under its care, that no
doubt can be entertained as to its literal application to all
the property of the Society which it would be lawful and
proper for it to possess. The funds on which it relies for
carrying on its work, however invested, whether in stock,
real estate, or otherwise, no less than the asylum building it-
self, are clearly embraced in the terms of the exemption;
and to exclude them from its operation would require the
insertion or addition of words which the Legislature did
not see fit to express. Undoubtedly, if the Corporation
should acquire property not needed or used for carrying on
the Institution, it would be an act outside of the objects and
purposes of the charter and ultra vires; and, as to such
property, it could not, in its own wrong, justly claim the
benefit of the exemption. But the property in question is
not obnoxious to this objection; it directly contributes to
the support of the Institution, and is held for that purpose
alone.
Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company v. Palmes38 holds
that immunity from taxation granted to a railroad company does
not pass by virtue of a conveyance of the railroad and its fran-
chises, but requires for its transfer some particular and express
description, indicating unequivocally the intention of the Legis-
lature that it might pass by an assignment. It is here referred
39 (1883) 109 U. S. 244.
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to because it re-affirms the rule laid down in several of the Ohio
Bank Tax cases, viz.:
The question we have to consider is, whether, in the judg-
ment under review, the Supreme Court of Florida gave
effect to a law of the State which, in violation of the Con-
stitution of the United States, impairs the obligation of a
contract. In reaching a conclusion on that point, we de-
cide for ourselves, independently of the decision of the State
Court, whether there is a contract, and whether its obliga-
tion is impaired; and if the decision of the question as to the
existence of the alleged contract requires a construction of
State Constitutions and laws, we are not necessarily gov-
erned by previous decisions of the State Courts, upon the
same or similar points, except where they have been so
firmly established as to constitute a rule of property. Such
has been the uniform and well settled doctrine of this court.
Bank v. Knoop, 16 How., 369.
The facts in Wright v. Georgia Railroad and Banking Corwl-
pany39 were: The charter of the Company, granted by special
act long before any restrictions upon the legislature by the State
Constitution, provided that "the stock of said Company and its
branches shall be exempt from taxation for and during the term
of seven years from and after completion of said railroads, or
any of them; and after that, shall be subject to a tax not exceed-
ing 1/ of one percent per annum on the net proceeds of their in-
vestments." Long after expiration of the seven year period of
entire exemption the State of Georgia undertook to levy a tax
upon the excess value of the Company's property, over the
amount of authorized capital fixed by its charter, and to levy a
franchise tax against it. The United States Circuit Court held
that the taxes so imposed were void, being in violation of the
contract of exemption, which provided an exclusive tax of one-
half of one percent on the net income of the Company. The
Supreme Court affirmed that judgment, upholding the exemption
as construed by the Circuit Court.
In the case of Wright v. Central of Georgia Railway,40 the
Augusta and Savannah Railroad and the Southwestern Railroad
were built under special charters containing irrepealable con-
tracts, by which their property was not to be taxed higher than
39 (1909) 216 U. S. 420.
40 (1915) 236 U. S. 674.
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one-half of one percent upon the annual income. Their charters
also empowered them, whenever they saw fit to do so, to rent or
farm out all or any part of their exclusive right of transporta-
tion. In 1862 both companies leased their respective roads and
franchises to the Central Railroad etc., Company of Georgia,
which by an amendment of its charter in 1852 had been au-
thorized to lease the two railroads above mentioned. The Cen-
tral Railroad and Banking Company was later re-organized as
the Central of Georgia Railway Company, and new leases were
in 1895 made to it of their respective roads for 100 years from
November 1, 1895, renewable for like terms forever. In 1912
executions were issued against the Central of Georgia Railway
to collect ad valorem taxes, as provided by general state law, on
the real estate, roadbed and franchise value, after crediting
one-half of one percent of the net income, on that portion of
its property known as the Augusta and Savannah Railroad and
the Southwestern Railroad. The United States District Court
granted a permanent injunction, holding that such additional
tax must be regarded as a violation of the irrepealable contract
exemption in the charters of the lessor companies; and the
Supreme Court affirmed that judgment.
The case of Wright v. Louisville and Nashville Railroad Com-
pany41 also arose under the charter of the Georgia Railroad and
Banking Company. That Company leased one of its lines of rail-
road to the Louisville and Nashville Railroad and the Atlantic
Coast Line Railroad, and the State of Georgia undertook to tax
the lines so leased, under the general law of the State, as the
property of the lessees. The Court adhered to its decision in
the original case that the taxing provision in the charter of the
Georgia Railroad and Banking Company constituted a contract
binding the State not to tax the property of that Company be-
yond the limit therein mentioned; from which it would neces-
sarily follow that the tax here in question could not be levied
on the lessor. It further held that inasmuch as the charter of
the lessor further authorized it to lease or rent all or portions of
its railroad, the property of the lessor while in possession of its
lessees under leases so authorized by its charter, could not be
taxed otherwise than as provided in the contract of exemption.
41 (1915) 236 U. S. 687.
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In Central of Georgia Railway Company v. Wright42 and same
case on rehearing,43 Mr. Justice Holmes delivering the Court's
opinion, reversing the judgment of the State Supreme Court,
said:
It presents another attempt to accomplish, by a change in
form, what in Wright -v. Central of Georgia Ry. Co., 236
U. S. 674, was held to be an unconstitutional result. . .
In that decision . . . an attempt had been made to tax
the lessee for the property, the leases being for one hundred
and one years, renewable for like periods upon the same
terms forever. The tax was laid upon the real estate, road-
bed, and franchise value (with a certain deduction) of the
two lessors. It was held that the statutes [Special Charter]
made the fee exempt from other taxation than that provided
for, in favor as well of the lessee as of the lessor. The taxes
now attempted to be levied are upon the leasehold interests
of the lessee in the same roads, and it is argued that, if the
leases produce a profit in excess of the rental, the value is
required to be taxed by the Constitution of the State. But
the Constitution was subsequent to the charters that created
the exemption, and must yield to them if they apply to the
present attempt. We are of the opinion that although the
decision in the former case was necessarily confirmed to
the question before the court, the reasoning applies with
equal force to that now before us.
42 (1919) 248 U. S. 525.
43 (1919) 250 U. S. 519.
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